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TORTURE BY THE U.S.A.: HOW CONGRESS
CAN ENSURE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS
CREDIBILITY
KYLE MCCONNELL*
INTRODUCTION
Torture: “One such incident would be an isolated
transgression; two would be a serious problem; a dozen of them is
policy.”1
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
has faced a challenging road to discovering the best way to conduct
the war on terror against unconventional terrorist groups.
Unfortunately, part of this road has seen violations of human and
constitutional rights when the executive branch authorized federal
and military officials to use techniques constituting torture as part
of interrogation policies for those suspected of having terrorist
ties.2
However, the executive branch expanding its interpretation of
its war powers under the Constitution is not unique to the current
“war on terror.”3 What is unprecedented is the slew of lawsuits4 for
torture5 and other abuses committed pursuant to interrogation
1. HINA SHAMSI, COMMAND’S RESPONSIBILITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S.
CUSTODY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2006), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-repweb.pdf (quoting John D. Hutson, Rear Admiral (Ret.), JAGC, USN).
2. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Detention and Interrogation in the
Post-9/11 World, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing in depth the
actions taken by the executive branch in developing its interrogation and
detention policies after 9/11).
3. See generally Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued
Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 307 (2006) (discussing the correlations between the Japanese internment
in World War II and the expansive detention policies of the Bush
administration after September 11, 2001).
4. See infra note 10 (providing a list of cases brought by detainees seeking
compensation for injuries sustained during interrogation and detention).
5. For the purposes of this Comment, the definition of torture is that
found in the Federal Criminal Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004):
(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control;
(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm
1209
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and detention policies authorized at the highest levels of the
executive branch.
The inevitable questions that have arisen are whether these
allegations should be entertained by the courts; if so, who should
be held responsible; and finally, what legal framework should be
employed for adjudicating the claims?
Part II of this Comment briefly describes the widespread
allegations of torture against federal and military officials since
2001 and the causes of action that plaintiffs have attempted to
plead for relief. It then explains how courts have dismissed most of
these complaints at the pleading stage and concludes with a
discussion of the state secrets doctrine. Part III argues that the
executive branch’s expansive interpretation of its war powers after
9/11 was faulty and that Congress has appropriately exercised its
constitutional authority to govern detainee treatment previously.
It then argues that Congress should provide a private cause of
action for torture by federal officials that addresses not only the
protection of fundamental rights but also the concerns of national
security. Finally, Part IV proposes legislation for adjudicating civil
claims alleging torture by federal or military officials.
TORTURE AND THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR
RELIEF
As early as 2002, the FBI began complaining to the
Department of Defense (“DoD”) about the abusive tactics being
employed at Guantanamo Bay.6 In fact, over 230 soldiers and
officers have faced repercussions for torture and other acts of
abuse, and the Army has investigated more than 600 allegations of
detainee mistreatment.7 DoD documents have classified thirty four
detainee deaths as homicides taking place while in U.S. custody;

Id.

caused by or resulting from—
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

6. Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive
Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1264-65
(2006). In particular, the FBI complained about sexual humiliation, use of
dogs, and detainees being left naked in frigid temperatures without access to
bathrooms. Id.
7. Id. at 1258.
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at least eight of these men were tortured to death.8 Rather than
blaming low-level individuals who have failed to follow known
standards, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger placed
the responsibility for these abuses at a much higher level.9
As a result, the United States legal system has seen
numerous cases by both citizens and aliens seeking relief for the
injuries suffered during their interrogation and detention.10 Many
of the allegations in these cases are shocking. Subjecting detainees
to electrical shocks, hanging detainees by chains upside-down
while dogs grab at their arms, being sexually assaulted by
soldiers, and even being placed in a cage of live lions are
illustrative examples.11 Common allegations throughout many of
the cases include sleep deprivation, exposure to prolonged
temperature extremes, and beatings.12 Existing legal remedies for
torture and other abuses of U.S. citizen and alien detainees by the
United States during detention and interrogation have been
discussed and analyzed at length.13
8. SHAMSI, supra note 1, at 1.
9. See JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, HAROLD BROWN, TILLIE K. FOWLER &
CHARLES A. HORNER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW
DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS, 5 (Aug. 24, 2004), available at http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a39328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=10157 (click on “Download:” link
for .pdf version) (reporting that the widespread abuses were “not just the
failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than
the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both
institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels”).
10. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012); Lebron
v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F.
Supp. 2d 103, (D.C. Cir. 2010); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir.2009);
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
555 U.S. 1083 (2008); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007);
In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub
nom., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
11. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89.
12. Vance, 653 F.3d at 597; Doe, 683 F.3d at 692; Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp.
2d at 106.
13. See generally Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 169 (2004) (outlining the executive branch’s attempts to prevent
human rights litigation in U.S. courts); Roosevelt, supra note 2 (discussing the
actions of the executive branch and the responses from the judiciary and
legislative branches); Pearlstein, supra note 6 (discussing possible constraints
on the executive branch’s interpretation of its war powers); Richard Henry
Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715 (2006) (analyzing the
treatment of torture as a tort in U.S. courts); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a
Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (comparing and contrasting the U.S. response to 9/11
with that of our allies); George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via
Lawsuit”—the Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841 (2009) (contending that
Congress should act to strike the balance between individual liberty and
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Existing Legal Remedies Sought By Plaintiffs for Torture
In a nutshell, plaintiffs seeking to recover for torture inflicted
by government or military officials have difficulty surviving the
pleading stage14 and have attempted numerous causes of action.15
The most common cause of action torture claimants have pled
stems from the landmark case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.16 In Bivens, the Supreme
Court allowed a claim for damages to go forward against federal
officials for violating the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.17
The Court recognized the long-standing rule that courts will adjust
their remedies to grant necessary relief where citizens’ federally
protected rights have been invaded.18 Thus, Bivens created a
private cause of action to recover damages against federal officials
for constitutional violations.19
Since Bivens, many attempts have been made to extend its
national security).
14. See generally Seamon, supra note 13 (analyzing the liability under
domestic law for torture by U.S. officials and concluding that current law is
inadequate); Stephens, supra note 13 (discussing the Bush administration’s
efforts to limit human rights litigation in U.S. courts); John Ip, Comparative
Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 856 (2007) (noting the lower federal courts’ deference
to asserted national security concerns in detention and interrogation cases).
15. See, e.g., Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (pleading causes of action under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), and the Detainee Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (2006));
Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d 795 (pleading cause of action under Bivens); AlZahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (pleading causes of action under Bivens and the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)); Arar, 585 F.3d 559 (pleading
causes of action under Bivens and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350));
Rasul, 512 F.3d at 649 (pleading causes of action under Bivens, the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2000), and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et seq.); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300 (pleading cause of
action under Bivens and the Alien Tort Statute); In re Iraq and Afg. Detainees
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (arguing that the Geneva Conventions are selfexecuting).
16. 403 U.S. 388.
17. Id. at 397. Specifically, the Court recognized that
[the Fourth Amendment] guarantees to citizens of the United States the
absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
carried out by virtue of federal authority. And “where federally protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.”
Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
18. Id. at 392. The Court also recognized that an agent acting in the name
of the United States “possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an
individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” Id.
19. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (holding that Bivens
established a right to recover damages against an official in federal court even
in the absence of a statute conferring such a right).
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context to other constitutional violations.20 The Supreme Court
has continuously narrowed its application, however, and the last
seven attempts to extend it to new contexts have failed.21 A Bivens
cause of action can be defeated in two situations.22 The first
situation is when a court finds there are “special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”23 The
second situation is when Congress has provided an alternative
remedy that it expressly provides as a substitute for recovery
under the Constitution and is viewed as equally effective.24
Until recently, plaintiffs seeking a Bivens action for torture
have found courts unreceptive primarily due to the “special factors
counseling hesitation” exception.25 This exception to Bivens
20. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 567 (2007) (denying Bivens relief
for alleged violations of Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment by employees of
Bureau of Land Management); Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,
74 (2001) (denying Bivens relief for damages against private entities acting
under color of federal law for alleged constitutional violations); F.D.I.C. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (holding that plaintiff could not bring Bivens
action against a federal agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414
(1988) (refusing to extend Bivens to termination of social security benefits in
violation of claimant’s Fifth Amendment rights); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (denying availability of Bivens action to servicemen who
claimed they had been given LSD unknowingly); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
390 (1983) (denying Bivens action for First Amendment violations); Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (holding that superior officers could not be
sued for racial discrimination); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 (alleging a violation of
Eighth Amendment rights); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228 (1979)
(alleging a violation of due process under Fifth Amendment). .
21. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 567 (refusing to extend Bivens action to
violations of Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74
(refusing to extend Bivens action to private parties who violate constitutional
rights under color of federal law); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486 (refusing to extend
Bivens action to plaintiff’s action against a federal agency); Chilicky, 487 U.S.
at 414 (refusing to extend Bivens action to termination of social security
benefits that violate Fifth Amendment rights); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 686
(refusing to extend Bivens action to servicemen seeking recovery for
allegations they were given LSD without their consent); Lucas, 462 U.S. at
390 (refusing to extend Bivens action to First Amendment violations); Wallace,
462 U.S. at 305 (refusing to allow recovery under Bivens action for racial
discrimination by superior officers); but see Passman, 442 U.S. at 248
(allowing Bivens action for violation of due process under Fifth Amendment);
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24-25 (allowing Bivens action for alleged violation of
Eighth Amendment rights).
22. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18; see also Brown, supra note 13, at 849
(discussing the two exceptions to the Bivens doctrine); see generally Alan K.
Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006)
(discussing at length the defense of qualified immunity).
23. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18.
24. Id.
25. Vance, 701 F.3d at 200; Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 787; Ali, 649 F.3d at
774; Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 112; Arar, 585 F.3d at 573; Rasul, 512
F.3d at 672 (Brown, J., concurring); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311; see also James
E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
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“relate[s] not to the merits of the particular remedy, but to the
question of who should decide whether such a remedy should be
provided.”26
One court faced with torture allegations has explained the
special factors exception as meaning that a new, non-statutory
remedy should not be created “when doing so would be ‘plainly
inconsistent’ with authority constitutionally reserved for the
political branches.”27 Because the claims arise in the course of
ongoing military campaigns, the courts have determined the
judicial branch should not encroach upon the realm of Congress
due to national security concerns.28 Consequently, various special
factors counseling hesitation related to national security have
been identified in dismissing Bivens complaints.29
Recently, two courts allowed two U.S. citizens to proceed with
their Bivens claims against high-ranking government officials for
torture but were ultimately reversed.30 The courts distinguished
these claims from other unsuccessful Bivens actions for torture on
the basis that U.S. citizens brought the claims rather than

Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (2009) (acknowledging the
lower federal courts’ refusal to recognize a Bivens remedy for claims stemming
from detention and extraordinary rendition).
26. In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see generally Stephen I.
Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
255, 269-75 (2010) (arguing “that poorly defined ‘national security’ concerns”
have surfaced as their own special factor counseling hesitation in postSeptember 11th damages litigation).
27. In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103
(quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). The court also noted
that “even when authority is not constitutionally reserved for the political
branches, there nevertheless might be reasons that favor allowing Congress,
rather than the judiciary, to prescribe the scope of relief available to the
plaintiffs.” Id.
28. Id. at 105.
The hazard of such multifarious pronouncements-combined with the
constitutional commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political
branches and the Court’s previously express concerns about hindering
our military’s ability to act unhesitatingly and decisively- warrant
leaving to Congress the determination whether a damages remedy
should be available under the circumstances presented here.
Id. at 107.
29. See Lebron, 764 F.Supp.2d at 800 (holding these factors include the
impact on the nation’s military affairs, foreign affairs, intelligence, and
national security and the likely burden of such litigation on the government’s
resources in these essential areas); see also Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia
in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of
Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 219 (2010) (arguing the Court has overcompensated
in its handling of Bivens actions, resulting in bias against plaintiffs).
30. Vance, 653 F.3d 591, rev’d en banc, 701 F.3d 193; Doe, 800 F.Supp.2d
94, rev’d, 683 F.3d 390.

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/15/2014 9:02 AM

Torture by the U.S.A.

1215

aliens.31 The reversal of these decisions effectively shut the door on
Bivens as a viable remedy.
Existing Statutes Do Not Provide A Cause of Action
Several other statutes along with the Geneva Conventions
have also been the source of claims by plaintiffs seeking relief for
torture. These include the Alien Tort Statute32 (“ATS”), the
Detainee Treatment Act33 (“DTA”), and the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”).34 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Supreme Court held that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action.”35 This decision has prevented
plaintiffs from gaining relief under the ATS for torture
allegations.36
In 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act in
response to public pressure regarding widespread torture
allegations.37 The DTA provides that “[n]o individual in the
custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.”38 Plaintiffs have attempted to use the DTA as a
31. See Vance, 653 F.3d 591, rev’d en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (holding other
courts’ denial of Bivens remedies to aliens are readily distinguishable due to
the different circumstances of aliens and U.S. citizens); Doe, 800 F.Supp.2d at
110, rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (holding that because Doe is a United States citizen
the fear of “allowing enemy aliens to engage domestic courts in continuing
hostilities is not present here”).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2000). “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. “The
statute is referred to by courts interchangeably as the Alien Tort Claims Act,
the Alien Tort Statute, or the Alien Tort Act.” 14A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. §
3661.1 (3d ed.).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (2006). “No individual in the custody or under the
physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment.” Id. The statute defines such treatment as “the cruel, unusual,
and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” Id.
34. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000)).
35. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).) In Ali v. Rumsfeld, the
D.C. Circuit applied that Supreme Court holding. 649 F.3d at 776-77.
36. Ali, 649 F.3d at 776 (holding that “nothing in the ATS imposes any
obligations or duties of care upon the defendants”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd; See Pearlstein, supra note 6, at 1287 (discussing
the public pressure that played a “pivotal role in securing Senator McCain’s
public engagement on the question of torture, and the eventual overwhelming
passage of McCain’s amendment to ban cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment wherever U.S. officials operate”).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a).
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source of relief for actions violating its language.39 However,
because the statute does not expressly provide a right of action,
courts have rejected the invitation to imply a private cause of
action under the Act.40 Similarly, the Geneva Conventions have
not been found to provide plaintiffs with a private cause of action
for torture based on the interpretation that it is not a selfexecuting treaty.41
The Torture Victim Protection Act has also failed to provide
torture victims with a remedy.42 For example, in a challenge to
extraordinary rendition, the Second Circuit held that the TVPA’s
requirement that the official must have acted under the authority
or color of law of a foreign nation does not provide an action
against U.S. officials alleged to have conducted torture.43
The State Secrets Privilege
The state secrets privilege, more than the lack of a viable
cause of action, has proven to be the most damaging blow to
plaintiffs seeking relief for torture.44 The privilege was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1953.45 This privilege allows
the government to prevent “the disclosure of information in a
judicial proceeding if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that such
disclosure ‘will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.’”46
39. Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 104-05.
40. See Id. (holding “it is for Congress to create private rights of action to
enforce federal statutes” (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87
(2001)).
41. In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 117
(explaining that “because Geneva Convention IV manifests an intent to be
enforced through legislation or diplomacy,” it does not provide a private cause
of action for plaintiffs to sue defendants for money damages).
42. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
43. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568. Extraordinary rendition has been defined as
“the transfer of an individual, with the involvement of the United States or its
agents, to a foreign state where there are substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Peter Johnston,
Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why All Victims of Extraordinary Rendition
Need a Cause of Action against the United States, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 357, 360
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
44. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007) (analyzing the central
role the state secrets privilege has played in civil litigation regarding the
executive branch’s counterterrorism policies); see also David Aronofsky &
Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and International Human Rights: Does
Europe Get It Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 567, 580 (2009) (discussing
the difficulty of overcoming an invocation of the state secrets doctrine and
resulting consequence of cases almost always being dismissed).
45. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
46. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 302 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); see also
Chesney, supra note 44, at 1254-63 (conducting an in-depth analysis of the
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A three-part analysis is used to resolve a state secrets
privilege claim.47 First, a court must determine whether the
procedural requirements for invoking the privilege are satisfied.48
Second, a court must determine if “the information sought to be
protected qualifies as privileged under the state secrets
doctrine.”49 If the first two parts are satisfied, the final question is
whether the case can proceed in light of the successful privilege
claim and, if so, in what manner.50
Since 9/11, one of the most prominent examples of the effect
the state secrets privilege can have on torture complaints is ElMasri v. U.S.51 El-Masri, a German citizen, alleged that CIA
Director George Tenet, among others, authorized his illegal
detention and torture in an extraordinary rendition operation
before, and for several months after, the government realized he
was not the person they were looking for.52 Although the court
recognized dismissal would leave El-Masri without a remedy, it
ruled that virtually any response to his allegations would disclose
privileged information.53 Therefore, the court upheld the lower
court’s dismissal.54
In sum, plaintiffs who have sought to recover damages for
abuse constituting torture have thus far found the judicial realm
inhospitable to their claims due to the lack of a private cause of
action combined with the readily available state secrets privilege.
THE CONSTITUTION GIVES CONGRESS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
DETENTION AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
The first part of this Comment demonstrated the problem of
official torture and the resulting litigation seeking relief. Although
many statutes, along with Bivens, on their face appear to deal with
the issue, courts have consistently declined these attempts to state
a private cause of action for the reasons discussed above.
Part A of the next section of this Comment examines the
Executive Branch’s constitutional argument that no other branch
of government has the ability to regulate its treatment of
detainees in the war on terror. Part B argues not only that the
government’s reliance on the state secrets privilege in defending against ElMasri’s allegations).
47. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 479 F.3d 296.
52. Id. at 299-300.
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id. at 308 (noting that a proceeding in which the state secrets privilege
is successfully interposed must be dismissed if the circumstances make clear
that privileged information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt
to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure).
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Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to check the
executive branch’s treatment of detainees, but also that the
judicial branch has recognized this authority over the course of its
jurisprudence regarding this issue. Part C points out the
deficiency of the Bivens doctrine as a remedy. Part D then argues
that although Congress can and should act, it must adequately
address the issue of protecting national security by reforming the
state secrets privilege in the process of creating a remedy for
victims of official torture.
The Executive Branch’s Expansive Interpretation of Its Exclusive
Power after 9/11
In the years immediately following 9/11, the executive branch
began to interpret any limits on its power to manage the global
war on terror as unconstitutional.55 Much discussed memos by the
Office of Legal Counsel for then-President Bush’s administration
did not mince words in arguing that statutes concerning torture,
such as the Federal Criminal Torture Statute,56 cannot be
constitutional if they apply to the executive branch.57 Although it
should be noted that eventually these memos were withdrawn, it
has been pointed out that many of the “most brutal atrocities” at
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib occurred while the memos were in
55. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Asst. Att’y General, to Deputy
Counsel for the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting
Them, 32 (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
warpowers925.htm [hereinafter “Yoo Memorandum”](finding that Congress
may not “place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist
threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method,
timing, and nature of the response” and that “[t]hese decisions, under our
Constitution, are for the President alone to make”).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2001).
57. Yoo Memorandum, supra note 55, at 31-32; see also Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of
Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 34-35 (Aug. 1,
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf
[hereinafter “Bybee Memorandum”] (concluding that “to respect the
President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military
campaign[,] . . . Section 2340A must be construed as not applying to
interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority”).
The Bybee Memorandum goes on to state that Congress does not have the
authority “under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise his authority . . . Congress may no more regulate the
President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may
regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield.” See also
Shayana Kadidal, Does Congress Have the Power to Limit the President’s
Conduct of Detentions, Interrogations and Surveillance in the Context of War?,
11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 23 (2007) (analyzing memos by Office of Legal Counsel
that expanded the interpretation of the executive branch’s exclusive
authority).
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full effect.58
As Dean Chemerinsky puts it, “[t]he key from a separation of
powers perspective is the consistent claim of unchecked and
uncheckable executive authority. The Bush administration over
and over again argued that it alone could decide whether a person
was to be held or released.”59 He notes the other major example of
the Bush administration’s expansive view of presidential authority
is the argument found in the “torture memos” written by Office of
Legal Counsel Officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee.60 These officials
essentially ignored the role of Congress and the courts when they
argued that the president was not bound to obey the treaty and
federal statute prohibiting torture.61
The President certainly has the authority to respond to
attacks without Congressional approval.62 However, the argument
that this authority extends to complete and exclusive power to
control an ongoing conflict struggles to find explicit or implied
support in the Constitution.
Congress has the constitutional authority to enact a statute
governing the executive branch’s treatment of detainees.
The arguments discussed above that attempted to redefine
the executive branch’s authority in conducting the war on terror as
inherent and exclusive fail under an examination of the
Constitution along with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the Constitution. For example, Congress is
vested with not only the power “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces[,]”63 but
58. See Kadidal, supra note 57, at 48 (pointing out that Jack Goldsmith of
the Office of Legal Counsel instructed the Department of Defense not to rely
on these memos).
59. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restoring Separation of Powers, ABA HUM. RTS.
MAGAZINE, Vol. 35 No. 4, 6-7 (Fall 2008), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/
human_rights_vol35_2008/human_rights_fall2008/
hr_fall08_chemerinsky.html.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. See generally Scheppele, supra note 13, at 1051 (arguing that the
most pronounced change in the executive branch’s response to terrorism was
the Bush administration’s effort to bring the war on terrorism under the
executive branch’s sole authority and “minimize the influence of both Congress
and the courts”).
62. The Brig Amy Warwick, et al., 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (holding that
“[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but
is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority”); see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir.
1971) (holding that “[t]he executive may without Congressional participation
repel attack”).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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also to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”64
The Supreme Court has interpreted that the authority to
make rules for the military supports Congress’ plenary control
over the framework of the military establishment.65 Recently, in
fact, the Court has noted the overlapping war power authority
given to the executive and legislative branches by the
Constitution, specifically Congress’ power to make rules
concerning captures.66
Additionally, courts have repeatedly stated that Congress
should intervene in matters involving foreign policy and make the
determination as to whether a remedy should exist.67 For example,
the Supreme Court in Egan succinctly stated its position on when
the judiciary should involve itself in reviewing actions by the
executive branch: “unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs.”68
The combination of the enumerated powers vested in
Congress by the Constitution along with the extensive history of
the courts holding that Congress has the power to authorize
judicial review on military and national security matters leaves
little doubt about the fallacy of the executive branch’s contention
that Congress would be outside its authority in regulating the
treatment of detainees in the war on terror.

64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
65. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301 (holding that “it is clear that the
Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch has plenary control
over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the military
establishment, including regulations, procedures and remedies related to
military discipline”).
66. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591-92 (2006) (examining the
interplay between U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11).
67. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (recognizing that matters
concerning national security are areas “in which courts have long been
hesitant to intrude” absent congressional authorization); Dep’t of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting that “unless Congress specifically has
provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”);
Arar, 585 F.3d at 576 (holding that “[a]bsent clear congressional
authorization, the judicial review of extraordinary rendition would offend the
separation of powers and inhibit this country’s foreign policy”); Ali, 649 F.3d at
774 (declining to allow a Bivens claim, citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which held that “the danger of foreign citizens’
using the courts . . . to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is
sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a
damage remedy should exist”).
68. Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.
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The Failure of Bivens to Provide a Remedy
The failure of plaintiffs seeking relief under Bivens to advance
past the pleading stage sends a clear message that the war on
terror will continue to be seen as a “special factor counseling
hesitation” precluding relief under the doctrine.69 Furthermore,
the overshadowed holding by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal70, due to the case’s impact on the pleading standard, rejected
the availability of supervisory liability under Bivens.71 Considering
that the discussion of supervisory liability was unnecessary to the
holding, it seems to indicate the Court’s position on Bivens claims
in this context.72 Forcing a plaintiff to hold one particular official
liable, and a low-level official to be specific, does not provide an
effective deterrent for torture.73
Additionally, the Court’s continuous refusal over the past
several decades to extend Bivens to new contexts demonstrates the
important role Congress plays in providing relief for torture.74
Indeed, the consistent holding of the courts is that plaintiffs
should look to Congress, rather than the courts via Bivens, for
providing a remedy.75
69. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 574-76, 581 (explaining the national security
concerns that qualify as special factors counseling hesitation and holding that
until Congress provides a remedy particular to these situations, courts should
not enter the arena of balancing individual rights against those national
security concerns).
70. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
71. Id. (holding that in a Bivens action, the term supervisory liability is a
misnomer and that absent vicarious liability, each Government official is only
liable for his or her own misconduct).
72. Vladeck, supra note 27, at 268 (pointing out that because the
petitioners had conceded that officers could be subject to Bivens liability as
supervisors and the holding on pleading standards making the conclusion on
supervisory liability unnecessary, the Court’s discussion of Bivens seems to
signal a much larger point, “either about Bivens in general, or about its
specific application to cases such as Iqbal.”).
73. Seamon, supra note 13, at 802 (explaining that the “systemic nature of
official torture” makes it difficult to hold a particular official responsible under
Bivens).
74. Id. at 779 (reasoning that this disinclination to extend Bivens along
with the fact Congress has created remedies for the victims of official torture
inflicted under color of a foreign country’s law but not U.S. law leads to the
conclusion that Bivens is an unlikely answer to resolving torture claims); see
also Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting the Court,
since 1980, has consistently refused to extend Bivens).
75. See Vladeck, supra note 26, at 275 (arguing the consistent language of
opinions denying Bivens relief makes it hard to imagine how “a postSeptember 11th detainee could ever state a viable Bivens claim”); see also In re
Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (holding that the
other branches might arrive at a different conclusion than the judiciary about
where an interrogation technique falls). Therefore, this possibility combined
with the commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political branches
by the Constitution warrant leaving to Congress the determination whether a
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Protecting National Security
The conclusion that Congress has the power to enact statutes
governing the treatment of detainees does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Congress should enact such statutes without
paying great heed to the consequences of such a statute. One of the
most important considerations in this calculation is the effect such
a statute would have on national security.
The state secrets privilege is the primary mechanism used by
the executive branch to avoid civil litigation involving the war on
terror.76 Since 9/11, the state secrets privilege has been used to
avoid legal rulings on entire policies that have been widely
criticized.77 Although the state secrets privilege is necessary to
protect national security, the poorly defined nature and
requirements of the privilege should be revised.
By treating the privilege as a rule of evidence, rather than a
concept of justiciability as initially conceived, the state secret
privilege can be revised to protect national security without
automatically sounding the death knell for a plaintiff’s recovery.78
Additionally, it would prevent the executive branch from violating
separation of powers because the Constitution provides Congress
almost exclusive power to determine the jurisdiction of federal
courts.79
The possibility of dismissal after the government has invoked
the state secrets privilege has always existed.80 However,
damages remedy should exist. Id.
76. Justin Florence & Matthew Gerke, National Security Issues in Civil
Litigation: A Blueprint for Reform, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR, 253
(Benjamin Wittes ed. 2009) (explaining that “[u]nder current doctrine, the
government may assert the “state secrets privilege” to ask that courts dismiss
a case, prevent the use of evidence in it, or both” and that it has become the
courts’ primary method of handling civil lawsuits that are related to national
security information); see also Chesney, supra note 45, at 1250 (recognizing
the central role that the privilege has played in the Justice Department’s
handling of post-9/11 civil litigation).
77. Florence & Gerke, supra note 76, at 259 (noting that the Bush
administration avoided legal rulings on its rendition, interrogation, and
electronic surveillance programs that have been widely criticized).
78. See id. at 254 (treating state secrets privilege as rule of evidence would
“prevent courts from dismissing cases until they have had a chance to assess
the privilege claim and see other available, nonprivileged evidence that might
bear on its adjudication”).
79. Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1932 (2007) (arguing that when the state secrets
privilege is invoked to dismiss whole categories of cases, the executive branch
“intrudes not just on the power of courts and the rights of individuals, but on
the jurisdiction-conferring authority of the legislature as well”). The author
further argues that by seeking dismissal, the executive also prevents Congress
from working in conjunction with the judiciary to curb executive power. Id.
80. Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 625, 637 (2010) (acknowledging that critics of the state
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dismissal usually has occurred because the plaintiff could not
establish a prima facie case without the evidence subject to the
privilege.81 Instead, government officials have begun to assert the
privilege with the argument that the subject matter of the
litigation is a state secret and should be dismissed even where
plaintiffs could proceed with unprivileged information.82
Several additional reasons have been put forth supporting the
reform of the state secrets privilege.83 These include: the current
doctrine prevents the parties involved from knowing what their
rights are in advance; judges currently lack clear standards to
evaluate the claims; and the privilege currently fails to protect
litigants from being unfairly denied relevant evidence.84
Indeed, both the House of Representatives and the Senate
have offered versions of a bill to reform the state secrets
privilege.85 Both versions proposed to reform the privilege so that
it cannot constitute grounds for dismissal of a case or claim until a
hearing on the claim is conducted.86 By preventing motions to
dismiss or summary judgment motions from being granted until
parties have an adequate opportunity to complete non-privileged
discovery, government officials are held more accountable on
evidence and issues that are not covered by the privilege.87
secrets privilege point to cases being dismissed prior to the discovery process
as a flaw of the current state secrets privilege).
81. Id.; see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the state secrets privilege can have three effects: 1) by invoking
the privilege over particular evidence, that evidence is removed from the case
and the case proceeds based on evidence not covered by the privilege; 2) if the
privilege deprives the defendant of information needed to have a valid defense,
the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant; and 3) if the subject
matter of the action is a state secret, the case should be dismissed based solely
on the successful invocation of the privilege).
82. See Wells, supra note 80, at 637 n. 62 (noting recent cases that were
dismissed on a subject matter theory).
83. See Florence & Gerke, supra note 76, at 255 (including other reasons
such as the potential for abuse by the executive branch allowing it to avoid
accountability and failing to provide judges with clear standards to evaluate
state secrets claims). The authors also note that a subsequent consequence of
the latter reason is that if the executive branch continues to use the privilege
to avoid judicial review of its most controversial programs, a federal judge may
at some point consider a privilege claim as “the boy who cried wolf” and allow
genuinely important national security secrets to become public.
84. Id.
85. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009);
State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong., 1st Session (2009);
see also Florence & Gerke, supra note 76, at 253 (noting that the bills were
initially introduced in 2008 and both passed through their respective
committees). However, action on the bills was postponed due to a veto threat
by President Bush. Id.
86. S. 417; H.R. 984.
87. See Wells, supra note 80, at 650 (supporting the positive effects the
proposed reform could have on the privilege).
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Therefore, secrecy is still maintained while increasing government
accountability.
Both bills also proposed that the hearings on the privilege be
conducted in camera and that the court, upon request by the
government, may require counsel to obtain security clearance
before participation in the hearing.88 Although these bills have
stalled in their respective chambers, they represent a legitimate
attempt to reform the state secrets privilege while appropriately
protecting national security interests underlying the privilege.
By not providing a private cause of action, or any other means
for relief, the United States does itself great harm when it
presents the war on terror to the world as a necessary conflict.89
Allowing torture to become operating procedure in interrogation
policy produces propaganda for those we seek to stop and helps
produce future members of the terrorist groups we seek to disable.
Operating outside the rule of law also damages our relations with
allies.90 If Congress provides a private cause of action allowing
relief to those who have been subjected to techniques constituting
torture, the United States would effectively be putting its money
where its mouth is when it advocates to the world that the United
States stands for human, not just American, rights.91
However, any cause of action must accomplish two competing
interests at the same time: restraining but also empowering the
executive branch.92 The following section proposes the framework
88. S. 417; H.R. 984. Other relevant provisions that appear in both
versions are: 1) allowing the Government to assert the privilege in connection
with any claim in a civil action, either where it is a party or where it
intervenes; 2) requiring the government to provide the court with an affidavit
signed by the head of the executive branch agency with control over the
information asserted to be privileged; 3) allowing for an interlocutory appeal
upon disposition of the privilege; 4) in ruling on the validity of the privilege,
the court should make an assessment of whether the harm identified by the
government is reasonably likely to occur if the privilege is not upheld. Id.
89. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF TERROR, 147 (2008) (drawing the conclusion that because the
United States has championed the Geneva Conventions along with other
international commitments, enormous harm is caused when it presents the
war on terrorism as being in conflict with those commitments).
90. Roosevelt III, supra note 2, at 37 n. 248 (noting that Italy and
Germany issued warrants for the arrest of CIA agents involved in the
abduction of suspects in their respective countries as part of the extraordinary
rendition program and concluding that cooperation between intelligence
agencies is more difficult when our agents are wanted criminals).
91. See generally SHAMSI, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting David R. Irvine, Brig.
Gen. (Ret.) as stating, “[t]he Army exists, not just to win America’s wars, but
to defend America’s values. The policy and practice of torture without
accountability has jeopardized both”).
92. WITTES, supra note 89, at 149 (2008) (arguing the law must restrain
the executive from actions we do not want it to take but also authorize the
president to take bold actions).
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for this legislation by providing a remedy for torture while still
providing the executive with ample protection of state secrets.
CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION THAT PROVIDES A REMEDY
FOR INNOCENT PARTIES SUBJECTED TO TORTURE BY THE UNITED
STATES
As explained above, Congress possesses the concurrent power
to also impose its will in the area of detention and interrogation.
In order to help prevent the recurrence of acts constituting torture
while conducting a war, Congress must be the branch to act
decisively in providing a legitimate remedy for those who suffer
such acts.
This Section proposes the legislation that would accomplish
this goal. First, this section will outline the proposed legislation.
Then, it will discuss the legislation in light of the two primary
considerations underlying it: protecting national security while
providing a legal remedy to those who endure acts constituting
torture. Finally, it will conduct hypothetical applications of the law
to two cases.
The Torture Remedy Act
Section 1.
1. Every person who, under color of any statute,
regulation, or other valid authority of the United
States, subjects, causes to be subjected, or authorizes
any citizen of the United States or other person not
found guilty of a crime against the United States in a
court of law to an act or acts that constitute torture as
defined in 18 U.S.C. 2340,93 shall be liable to the
injured party in an action at law for redress.94
2. The United States shall also be liable for damages
resulting from violations of this Act.
a. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
prevent the United States from intervening in
an action under this Act to which it is not a
party for the purpose of stating a claim for
state secrets privilege in accordance with the
provisions of section 3 of this Act.
3. Any person who alleges a violation of this Act may
bring an action at law for redress so long as they have
not been found guilty of a crime against the United
93. See supra note 4 (quoting the definition of “torture” from the statute).
94. The language in this section is inspired by and partly tailored after 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Seamon, supra note 11, at 758-59 (proposing that the U.S.
government be held liable for torture just as local governments would be held
liable for civil rights violations under § 1983).
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States or one of its agents.
4. Damages. A party found to have violated this Act may
be subjected to a finding of compensatory and/or
exemplary damages.
Section 2. Protection of State Secrets.
1. State Secrets Privilege. Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to prevent the United States from claiming
a privilege to refuse to give information and to
prevent any person from giving information that
would be reasonably likely to cause significant harm
to the defense or the diplomatic relations of the
United States.95
a. The Government’s claim of privilege in actions
arising under this Act shall be subject to the
procedures in Section 3 of this Act.
Section 3. State Secrets Privilege96
1. In General. The court shall take steps to protect
sensitive information that comes before the court in
connection with proceedings under this Act. These
steps may include reviewing evidence or pleadings
and hearing arguments ex parte, issuing protective
orders, requiring security clearance for parties or
counsel, placing material under seal, and applying
security procedures established under the Classified
Information Procedures Act for classified information
to protect the sensitive information.
2. Assertion of the Privilege.
a. The Government may assert the privilege in
connection with any claim in a civil action to
which it is a party or may intervene in a civil
action to which it is not a party in order to
protect information it believes may be subject
to the privilege.
b. If the Government asserts the privilege, the
Government shall provide the court with an
affidavit signed by the head of the executive
branch agency with responsibility for, and
control over, the information asserted to be
subject to the privilege. In the affidavit, the
head of the agency shall explain the factual
basis for the claim of privilege. The
Government shall make public an unclassified
version of the affidavit.
95. H.R. 984.
96. Section 3 of the Act is based on a compilation of legislation proposed by
the Senate and the House of Representatives in 2009. S. 417; H.R. 984.
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3. In Camera Proceedings. All hearings and other
proceedings under this Act may be conducted in
camera, as needed to protect information that may be
subject to the privilege.
4. Attorney Security Clearances.
a. In general. A Federal court shall, at the
request of the United States, limit
participation in hearings conducted under this
chapter, or access to motions or affidavits
submitted under this chapter, to attorneys
with appropriate security clearances, if the
court determines that limiting participation in
that manner would serve the interests of
national security. The court may also appoint
a guardian ad litem with the necessary
security clearances to represent any party for
the purpose of adjudicating privilege claims
under this Section.
b. Court oversight. If the United States fails to
provide a security clearance necessary to
conduct a hearing under this chapter in a
reasonable period of time, the court may
review in camera and ex parte the reasons of
the United States for denying or delaying the
clearance to ensure that the United States is
not withholding a security clearance from a
particular attorney or class of attorneys for
any reason other than protection of national
security.
5. Procedures for Answering a Complaint.
a. Impermissible as Grounds for Dismissal Prior
to Hearings. The state secrets privilege shall
not constitute grounds for dismissal of a case
or claim. Furthermore, the court shall not
resolve any issue or claim and shall not grant
a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment based on the state secrets privilege
until the party adversely affected by the
privilege has had a full opportunity to
complete nonprivileged discovery and to
litigate the issue or claim to which the
privileged information is relevant without
regard to that privileged information.
b. Pleading State Secrets. In answering a
complaint, if the United States or an officer or
agency of the United States is a party to the
litigation, the United States may plead the
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state secrets privilege in response to any
allegation in any individual claim or
counterclaim if the admission or denial of that
allegation in that individual claim or
counterclaim would itself divulge a state
secret to another party or the public. If the
United States has intervened in a civil action,
it may assert the state secrets privilege in
response to any allegation in any individual
claim or counterclaim if the admission or
denial by a party of that allegation in that
individual claim or counterclaim would itself
divulge a state secret to another party or the
public. No adverse inference or admission
shall be drawn from a pleading of state secrets
in an answer to an allegation in a complaint.
6. Determination of Applicability of Privilege.
a. As to each item of evidence that the United
States asserts is protected by the state secrets
privilege, the court shall review the specific
item of evidence to determine whether the
claim of the United States is valid. An item of
evidence is subject to the state secrets
privilege if it contains a state secret, or there
is no possible means of effectively segregating
it from other evidence that contains a state
secret.
b. Admissibility and disclosure.
i. Privileged evidence. If the court agrees
that an item of evidence is subject to
the state secrets privilege, that item
shall not be disclosed or admissible as
evidence.
ii. Non-privileged evidence. If the court
determines that an item of evidence is
not subject to the state secrets
privilege, the state secrets privilege
does not prohibit the disclosure of that
item to the opposing party or the
admission of that item at trial, subject
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
iii. Standard of review. The court shall
give substantial weight to an assertion
by the United States relating to why
public disclosure of an item of
evidence would be reasonably likely to
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cause significant harm to the national
defense or foreign relations of the
United States. The court shall weigh
the testimony of a Government expert
in the same manner as the court
weighs, and along with, any other
expert testimony in the applicable
case.
Providing an Adequate Remedy at Law While Protecting State
Secrets
The two primary and competing goals of the Act are 1) to
provide an adequate remedy at law for innocent parties subjected
to acts constituting torture; and 2) to create a workable framework
for litigating these claims that still provides strong protection of
state secrets.
How the Torture Remedy Act Provides an Adequate Remedy at
Law.
The Torture Remedy Act would explicitly enable plaintiffs to
state a valid claim for torture under specific circumstances. First,
a plaintiff must not have been convicted of a crime against the
United States or one of its officials. This barrier to entry, so to
speak, would help diminish the possibility that those seeking to
harm the United States would be able to conduct what has been
called “counter-counter-terrorism by lawsuit.”97
Second, the Act would only allow recovery for acts that fit the
definition already established by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 2340.98
This definition successfully furthers the competing interests of
preventing severe techniques while not hampering interrogation
efforts using less harsh, but still effective, interrogation and
detention techniques. The definition limits acts constituting
torture to those that cause or threaten severe pain or physical
suffering, or threatens imminent death to that person or another
person. For example, one of the most controversial and discussed
interrogation techniques, waterboarding99, would violate the Act
because it threatens imminent death and would theoretically be
prevented from reoccurring in the future should the executive
97. Brown, supra note 13, at 844 (citing Richard Klinger, The Court, the
Culture Wars, and Real War, 30 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., June 2008, at
1, 4).
98. Supra note 4.
99. Waterboarding is a procedure where “a person is forcibly seized and
restrained. He or she is then immobilized, face up, with the head tilted
downward. Water is then poured into the breathing passages.” Daniel
Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: Legal Interpretation and the Continuing
Struggle for Human Rights, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 204 (2009).
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branch reconsider its use.
Additionally, supervisory liability would be allowed upon a
showing that the principal authorized the agent to commit the
acts. Supervisory liability is critical to influencing policy in a
manner that seeks to eliminate techniques constituting torture. By
holding those in policy-making positions accountable for
authorizing actions that clearly violate the Act, the interest of
clearly delineating the appropriate actions and techniques for the
servicemen and women who are charged with interrogating
suspects would be furthered.100
The Torture Remedy Act Would Reform the Procedure in Claiming
State Secrets Privilege While Maintaining Strong Protection.
Section III of the Torture Remedy Act plays a vital role in the
feasibility of implementing the Act as a check on the use of
techniques constituting torture.101 Without strong protection of
state secrets, soldiers and other government officials could be
placed at risk, an unacceptable outcome. However, the manner in
which the state secrets privilege is invoked and evaluated must be
reformed in order to ensure that it does not result in sidestepping
liability under the Act by its mere invocation.
A major change that Section III would implement is
preventing claims under the Act from being dismissed before the
adversely affected party has a full opportunity to complete nonprivileged discovery and litigate the claim without the privileged
information. This change would help ensure that claims that can
progress without the privileged information will not be ended
prematurely. On the other hand, the standard of review would be
weighted in the government’s favor to ensure that the government
is able to secure the privilege where appropriate. By ensuring that
the government is able to invoke the privilege where needed but
preventing the privilege from acting as an absolute shield from
claims under the Act, Section III appropriately reforms the state
secrets privilege so that both interests are protected.
Although the most recent administration has issued an
executive order102 that requires all interrogation techniques to
comply with the United States obligations under laws regulating
the treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in an
armed conflict, the need to provide a concrete legal remedy to
100. See BROWN, FOLWER, HOMER & SCHLESINGER, supra note 9, at 5
(recognizing that high levels of institutional authority were partly responsible
for the widespread abuses that have occurred during the early years of the
war on terror). By allowing supervisory liability, those who craft the
interrogation and detention techniques would theoretically start a trickledown effect of responsible intelligence-gathering.
101. Supra note 96 and corresponding text.
102. Exec. Order No. 13, 491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (January 22, 2009).

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/15/2014 9:02 AM

Torture by the U.S.A.

1231

violations of these obligations remains a necessity. The Torture
Remedy Act fulfills this need.
CONCLUSION
For the United States to remove the black eye of torture,
Congress must act. The Torture Remedy Act would help ensure
that torture becomes a tragedy of the past instead of policy for the
future.

